A few years ago I took to the pages of Proceedings to encourage my fellow naval professionals to write and publish. Putting your thoughts in the public domain—where they can be examined, criticized, and even ridiculed—can push those of us who have spent our careers in uniform out of our comfort zones. I have met officers who would not hesitate to land on a stormy deck at night or dive to crush depth on a nuclear submarine, yet find the reputational and professional risk of putting their ideas indelibly on paper a challenge not worth taking.
The authors of this compilation have thankfully ignored any such misgivings and chosen to step into the intellectual arena. For that they deserve credit and, more importantly, for us to consider what they have to say. All of them are senior leaders within their respective organizations and all of them have taken the time to examine how their service, agency, or department can ensure its continued effectiveness in the decades to come.
The challenges they describe are myriad: increasing fiscal constraints on defense spending; the changing international order created by the rise of China; the proliferation of new technologies that are eroding our traditional military edge; the rapid aging of our existing weapons systems; the perpetual bureaucratic obstacles to effective government-wide coordination; among others. Dealing successfully with the second and third-order consequences of these trends will require creative thinking and a departure from our traditional ways of doing business as a military and as a nation. As such, this book is an important addition to the burgeoning body of literature concerning the future of the U.S. national security architecture. It is clear-eyed in its assessment of the difficulty of the challenges we must overcome and the recommendations it offers are more than mere palliative measures. Indeed, they have the potential to dramatically alter the nature of the strategic competition we are engaged in.
In the late nineteenth century, the British Navy was the unchallenged master of the maritime domain. Since Nelson’s victory at Trafalgar in 1805, no major power had dared to contest the open oceans. And yet, British naval superiority had been secured in an age of wood and sail, when the preferred surface warfare tactic was to get as close to an enemy vessel as possible and unleash a broadside. As the turn of the century approached, cannons had been replaced by naval artillery capable of firing a well-aimed shell over a mile and sail had given way to reciprocating steam engines which could propel ships to well over 15 knots.
In this new and uncertain environment, the Royal Navy had two options: it could continue to try to maintain its superiority through incremental improvements in ship design and the sheer weight of numbers, or it could revolutionize battleship construction and instantly render every other navy obsolete. It chose to do the latter with the creation of the H.M.S. Dreadnought, a ship that owed its birth to the single-minded determination and uncompromising vision of Sir John “Jacky” Fisher, First Sea Lord of the Royal Navy.
Though he enjoyed a rapid ascent to admiral, Fisher had always been an iconoclast within the hidebound ranks of the British naval service. As First Sea Lord, he applied his experience, intelligence, and perseverance to the task of determining how future sea battles should be fought—and most importantly, which kind of ship would succeed. Tasked with creating a new warship, Fisher conceived of making a quantum leap past contemporary naval technology by designing a vessel that was both very fast and had an armament composed entirely of big guns—two characteristics that no other battleship could boast. Despite the technological and bureaucratic obstacles in his path, Fisher succeeded beyond his wildest dreams; when H.M.S. Dreadnought was commissioned in December 1906 she was not just the most powerful ship afloat, she had changed the design of battleships forever.
There are a number of lessons we can draw from Sir Jacky’s example. First: consult the best. Fisher convened a Committee on Designs, composed of experts he respected and trusted, to help refine and realize his vision. Likewise, this book represents the combined wisdom of over 100 years of military experience. The authors have been there and done that, serving exceptionally in one of the most trying operational environments the United States has had to operate within in decades. The project was conceived and began at the Council on Foreign Relations, a think tank whose lineage extends to Teddy Roosevelt and whose members include many of the most celebrated national security thinkers in history.
Second: don’t be afraid to propose a radical solution. One of the most contentious debates during the development of H.M.S. Dreadnought concerned her steam turbine propulsion system. In 1905, turbines were an untested technology. Warships of the time were equipped with reciprocal engines that were a nightmare to maintain—they could require as much as 10 days of maintenance after a four-hour high speed run—and could not achieve the 21-knot top speed Fisher desired. Some members of the Committee thought it would be too risky to put such a new system on a critically important—and extremely expensive—new capital ship. Sir Jacky ultimately decided that the technological risk was worth it, and by using turbines assured that any ship with slower reciprocating engines would be doomed if it faced a dreadnought. Similarly, the authors in this book have not taken half measures; their policy recommendations are provocative and forward leaning. In the best intellectual traditions of the U.S. military, they ought to be discussed, debated, and thoroughly considered.
Finally: realize when the old rules no longer apply. Fisher brought together experts and took a chance on turbines because he recognized that the new technologies were fundamentally changing the way naval combat would be carried out. Even as some members of his own institution stubbornly clung to the past, Fisher had the vision necessary to foresee that the future was approaching quickly, and the Royal Navy could either lead from the front or be overtaken. The authors of this book are concerned with addressing a future that does not look as favorable to American power as the last few decades have been. They recognize that the comfortable margin of superiority the United States has enjoyed is coming to an end.
Rather than foolishly denying the existence of international shifts they find unpalatable, they have chosen to address them head-on.
As you read through the ensuing chapters, keep in mind that the recommendations espoused within are the product of many years of experience in peace and war. This book is not merely a result of academic analysis, it has been influenced by the authors’ own direct knowledge of challenges faced, and overcome, in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere. A wise man once said that we sweat more in training so that we bleed less in battle. Similarly, we write in peacetime so that, if and when we are forced to enter a battle, we do so with all the intellectual capital we can muster to help assure victory.
James Stavridis, PhD
Admiral, US Navy (Retired)